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Abstract: COVID-19 has severely impacted socioeconomically disadvantaged populations. To sup-
port pandemic control strategies, geographically weighted negative binomial regression (GWNBR) 
mapped COVID-19 risk related to epidemiological and socioeconomic risk factors using South Ko-
rean incidence data (January 20, 2020 to July 1, 2020). We constructed COVID-19-specific socioeco-
nomic and epidemiological themes using established social theoretical frameworks and created 
composite indexes through principal component analysis. The risk of COVID-19 increased with 
higher area morbidity, risky health behaviours, crowding, and population mobility, and with lower 
social distancing, healthcare access, and education. Falling COVID-19 risks and spatial shifts over 
three consecutive time periods reflected effective public health interventions. This study provides 
a globally replicable methodological framework and precision mapping for COVID-19 and future 
pandemics. 
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1. Introduction 
COVID-19 has corroborated insights gained from SARS, H1N1 influenza, and MERS 
pandemics showing socioeconomically disadvantaged populations are more severely im-
pacted from pandemics [1–4]. The reported gap between the COVID-19 rates of the most 
and least advantaged populations [5] present a potential for reducing the outbreak 
through targeted interventions. Unlike non-modifiable factors [6,7], such as populations 
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with genetic predispositions, population vulnerability to the infectious disease outbreaks 
can be remediated through targeted interventions. Population vulnerability to respiratory 
infectious diseases is characterized by multiple interrelated factors, such as family income, 
education, employment status, health behaviour, healthcare access and other area-health 
indicators [8,9]. Hence, identifying key socio-economic determinants for COVID-19 and 
mapping the vulnerable locales will enable policy makers to target specific modifiable 
factors in high-risk areas. 
Among various approaches to disentangle how socio-economic status (SES) impacts 
health, Coleman’s social theory has been regarded as exceedingly useful because of its 
treatment of SES beyond access to material resources but also a function of social and 
human capital that ‘uniquely locate the individual’s status in the social structure’. Blumenshine 
furthered the understanding by illustrating the mechanistic pathways between the socio-
economic position and health disparity, as the underlying socioeconomic determinants of 
individuals can determine their likelihood of being exposed to the pandemic virus, con-
tracting disease and timely and effective treatment after the disease developed [9]. 
Although prior studies provided COVID-19 risk factors, none identified COVID-19-
vulnerable locales associated with SES and COVID-19-specific epidemiological factors 
with acceptable generalizability and methodological capacity. Current COVID-19 studies 
relying on health disparity measures use arbitrary SES variables based on researchers’ 
preferences, irrespective of their COVID-19 relevance. Consequently, the SES measures 
across these studies are incomparable, limiting their usefulness. To address this, we inte-
grated Coleman’s Social Theory and Blumenshine’s mechanistic framework (Figure 1), 
which formulates a universal SES definition and SES indicator selection mechanisti-
cally/causally relevant to the COVID-19 health outcome. This approach can inform public 
health interventions to alleviate SES factor-related COVID-19 risk. 
Since SES and epidemiological data cover an expanse of highly intercorrelated vari-
ables, the composite SES index, derived from multiple unique SES variables help garner 
the most explanatory information from the contributing indicators. A single universal 
composite measure, like the commonly-used area-deprivation index [10], is limited to con-
trolling SES effects as confounders, but not when the study’s goal is assessing the effect of 
multiple SES determinants on health outcome (e.g. COVID-19 in this study). Therefore, a 
multiple composite SES index approach helps quantify each composite SES index’s effect 
on COVID-19 [11]. 
Thus far, one study used multi-scale Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) to 
map the US COVID-19 incidence rate, while accounting for selected SES variables (median 
household income, income inequality, percentage of nurse practitioners, and black female 
population) [12]. Since multi-scale GWR doesn’t fit a beta distribution typical for infec-
tious disease rates [13], we recommend Geographically Weighted Negative Binomial Re-
gression (GWNBR) to improve methodological accuracy. GWNBR directly uses discrete 
count data without further transformation, and is robust in the overdispersion, spa-
tial/temporal clustering and false-positives [14,15]. 
Globally, the COVID-19 pandemic emerged in waves with country-specific mitiga-
tion strategies producing sharp declines. To improve public health interventions by pre-
cision targeting of high-risk locales, this study identified key SES and epidemiological risk 
determinants and their geographic distribution. We chose South Korea because its 
COVID-19 incidence data presented extremely high overdispersion, temporality, and spa-
tial clustering, being more complex than typical infectious disease data. This allowed us 
to check our framework’s functionality to address the dramatic spatial and temporal dy-
namic of COVID-19 [16]. Our study’s goals were to; (1) provide methodological frame-
work for identifying COVID-19-vulnerable locales associated with SES and epidemiolog-
ical determinants; and (2) operationalize the framework using South Korean data to 
demonstrate its value. 
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2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Study Design and Population 
We used COVID-19 incidence data from January 20 through July 1, 2020, released 
from the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) [17] and prepared by 
the DS4C project [18]. The dataset is based on the report materials of KCDC and local 
governments from this time period. These data are available under the KOCL (Korea 
Open Government License). Analytical data consisted of 11,811 COVID-19 cases aggre-
gated by 250 districts (Table S1) aligned to SAS’s South Korean geographic matrix. Since 
the data were unavailable for Daegu’s subparts, we estimated the incidence from KCDC’s 
press release cluster reports. 
2.2. Conceptual Model 
Figure 1 shows the Coleman-Blumenshine Framework (CBF) refined approach, 
based on Coleman’s Social Theory and Blumenshine’s mechanistic framework [9,19]. The 
model defines SES as a function of material, social, and human capitals [8,19] and empha-
sizes pathways by how SES indicators differentially increase SARS-CoV-2 exposure and 
susceptibility to developing COVID-19 [9]. Based on the CBF model and COVID-19 risk 
factors literature [1,20–23], we identified seven area-level health and SES factors that de-
termined the SARS-CoV-2 exposure level and the likelihood of developing COVID-19 af-
ter exposure. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model of the causal relationship between the SARS-CoV-2 and area health/SE determinants. Abbre-
viations: material capital (MC), human capital (HC), social capital (SC), socioeconomic status (SES). Subscripts (i, j, k) 
indicate the number of variables used from the data sources. *Material, Human and Social Capital refers to latent structural 
components of the SES and COVID-19-specific determinants. Health and SES connected by arrows indicate the inter-re-
latedness of area health and SES, hereinafter, denoted as a health/SE. ⸸Area-health/SE themes identified relevant to 
COVID-19 based on the current person and population-level literature. As per Coleman’s social theory and contributing 
data underlying each health/SE theme, crowding, healthcare access and social distancing relates to material capital, health 
behaviour and area morbidity relates to human capital, whereas, crowding, education and population mobility to social 
capital. Modified from source [9,24]. Data sources: Korean Community Health Survey by the KCDC, Health Insurance 
Statistics by the National Health Insurance Services, Disability Status by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, Death Cause 
Statistics by the National Statistics Agency, Korean Census Bureau, Internal Migration Statistics by the Statistics Korea, 
and the State of Urban Planning Report by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism. 
2.3. SES Measurement and Epidemiological Factors 
All SES and epidemiological-related data were retrieved from the Korean Statistical 
Information Service’s (KOSIS) online data archive [25]. KOSIS offers a convenient one-
stop service for South Korea’s major domestic statistics. Table S2 presents the data sources 
used for SES measurement. Table S3 shows 24 data items out of 124 candidates relevant 
to the seven health/SE areas. We used an independent variable proxy for education, and 
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access, health behaviour, crowding, area morbidity, difficulty to social distancing, and population 
mobility. Factors were computed as linear combinations of the original variables selected 
for each health/SE theme. We used the first component scores [26] in calculating the com-
posite scores since they explained the largest data variation. Then we computed each var-
iable’s weight by dividing each factor score by the sum of all variable factor scores as, 
    ℎ   =       / ∑       
 
     (1)
where i relates to each theme’s variable and p is the number of each theme’s variables. 
Each thematic composite index was computed as the weighted average for all 250 district 
values. For example, the composite index for health behaviour was calculated as: 
Health behaviourk = 0.438×obesity by measurementk + 0.429×alcohol drinkingk + 0.100×current smokingk + 
0.033×self-reported obesityk  
(2)
where k is the original variable’s value for district k. Note that weights sum to 1 (0.438 + 
0.429 + 0.100 + 0.033 = 1). Six thematic composite indices and an individual proxy for edu-
cation (percentage of high school educated people) were used in the final models as inde-
pendent variables. 
The ratio of the 25th percentile and each theme’s maximum value was for healthcare access: 2.5; 
health behaviour: 1.2; crowding: 1.9; area morbidity: 1.3; education: 1.5; difficulty to social dis-
tancing: 3.0; and population mobility: 10.3.2.4. Statistics 
Our model outcome was the confirmed case counts of COVID-19 aggregated by 250 
districts. Global negative binomial regression (GNBR) and GWNBR [14] computed rela-
tive risk of COVID-19 associated seven area health/SE themes. 
2.4. Global Models 
GNBR models calculated relative COVID-19 risk for the entire study period and each 
pandemic phase. The global model was set as, 
COVID-19 = exp (β0 + β1 healthcare access + β2 health behaviour + β3 crowding + β4 area morbidity + β5 education 
+ β6 difficulty to social distancing + β7 population mobility + ε   
(3)
where, β0, …, βn were the intercept and regression coefficients, whereas ε was the model 
random error. 
2.5. Local Spatial Models 
We used Gaussian GWNBR to model discrete count data and handle overdispersion 
issues. GWNBR computed parameter estimates for all districts following, 
  ~     exp ∑      ,          ,  (  ,   )  (4)
where (  ,   ) are the locations (coordinates) of the data points j, for j = 1, . . . , n. The models 
empirically computed bandwidth, via the cross-validation criterion, and achieved mini-
mal Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) as, 
   = ∑     −     ( ) 
  
     (5)
where    ( ) is the estimated value for point j, omitting the observation j, and b is the 
bandwidth. The likelihood of false-positives was corrected by the method of da Silva and 
Fotheringham [27]. 
All statistical analyses including specific macro programs for spatial weight matrices 
and GWNBR models were implemented using SAS (version 9.4). Missing data (2%) were 
excluded from the analyses. 
3. Results 
Figure 2 compared the spatial COVID-19 distribution across pandemic phases. The 
initial outbreak wave occurred in Daegu which then spread to Gyeongsangbuk-do and 
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surrounding provinces in the early phase [22]. The second wave occurred in Seoul and its 
surrounding metropolises, Ulsan and Busan, and Gyeonggi-do province in the late phase 
of the pandemic. 
 
Figure 2. The spatial distribution of COVID-19 cases across pandemic phases. Early phase: from January 20 to March 20, 
2020. Middle phase: March 21 to April 15, 2020. Late phase: April 16 to July 1, 2020. The blue shades and bar heights both 
indicate the number of COVID-19 cases during each in each district. 
3.1. Global and Local Spatial Models 
Throughout the entire study period model, GNBR suggested that the COVID-19 risk 
associated with increased risky health behaviour, area morbidity, and difficulty to social dis-
tancing (Table 1). Inverse associations indicate an increased COVID-19 risk with reduced 
healthcare access, lower education, and increased efflux in population mobility. No substantial 
risk was associated with crowding. 
Table 1. Parameter estimates and 95% CI of the relative risk of COVID-19 associated with health and SES determinants 
during the entire study period (January 20–July 1, 2020). 
Health/SE themes Estimates Relative Risk (95% CI) p-Value 
Healthcare access −0.13 0.88 (0.84–0.92) < 0.0001 
Health behaviour 0.04 1.04 (1.01–1.07) 0.019 
Crowding 0.05 1.05 (0 .89–1 .25) 0.545 
Area morbidity 0.04 1.04 (1.03–1.06) < 0.0001 
Education −0.09 0.91 (0.86–0.97) 0.002 
Difficulty to social distancing 0.06 1.06 (1.01–1.12) 0.017 
Population mobility −0.22 0.80 (0.69–0.93) 0.003 
Dispersiona 2.49   
AIC 1850   
aThe variance of a negative binomial distribution; Abbreviations: Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), a measure of good-
ness of model fit; confidence interval (CI); socioeconomic (SE). 
We implemented global and local spatial models for the early, middle, and late pan-
demic phases. Figure 3 presents the relative risk of COVID-19 with its 95% CI from GNBR 
models, and Figure 4, the relative risk spatial distribution from GWNBR associated with 
seven thematic areas by pandemic phases. Table S4 provides more details on the stratified 
GNBR models. GWNBR fit data better than the global model given smaller AIC for the 
middle and late phases, respectively, (AICgwnbr ~1034 vs AICgnbr~1044, AICgwnbr ~1038 ver-
sus AICgnbr~1074) except for the early phase of the pandemic (AICgwnbr ~3533 vs 
AICgnbr~1527). This reflects the large spatial cluster emerging from Daegu church [22,28] 
activities during the early phase that subsequently spread to its neighbouring districts. 
The GNBR and GWNBR model results agreed across all pandemic phases. In the early 
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phase, lower healthcare access and education, and increased risky health behaviour, area mor-
bidity, difficulty to social distancing, and population mobility associated with higher COVID-
19 risk. The crowding-associated risk was not significant in GNBR. In the middle phase, 
healthcare access, area morbidity, education, and difficulty to social distancing remained im-
portant risk determinants. In the late phase, only healthcare access, health behaviour, and 
increased crowding significantly determined the COVID-19 risk. 
 
Figure 3. Relative Risk of COVID-19 associated with area health and SES determinants (GNBR 
models). Each panel shows the relative risk and its 95% confidence intervals associated with each 
thematic area. Colours represent the pandemic’s early (January 20 to March 20, 2020), middle 
(March 21 to April 15, 2020), and late phases (April 16 to July 1, 2020). The dashed line shows the 
reference level (1). Values over or below the reference line indicate statistically significant results 
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Figure 4. Spatial variation in the relative risk of COVID-19 associated with area-health and SES 
themes in the early, middle, and late phases of the pandemic (GWNBR models). In the maps, the 
blue colour gradient corresponds with larger (darker) to lower (lighter) relative risk. Areas in 
white indicate the relative risks are statistically not significant (α = 0.05). The figure consists of A, B 
and C columns respectively referring to the pandemic’s early (January 20 to March 20, 2020), mid-
dle (March 21 to April 15, 2020), and late phases (April 16 to July 1, 2020). 
GWNBR created early phase maps showing higher risk in non-contiguous districts 
(Figure 4A). This higher risk reflected virus transmission in the initially affected districts 
before spreading over larger areas. 
During the early phase, we found protective effects of improved healthcare access, 
higher education and outbound population mobility, whereas, the disease risk was in-
creased in the districts with higher risky health behaviour, area morbidity rate and diffi-
culty to social distancing. 
In the middle phase (Figure 4B), only healthcare access, area morbidity rate, educa-
tion and difficulty to social distancing remained as the key risk-determinants with the 
same directions but reduced strengths. Spatial shifts from the early phase were from the 
northwest toward the capital and southwest regions. 
In the late phase (Figure 4C), healthcare access, risky healthy behaviour and area 
crowding were primary risk-determinants. We observed the protective effect of improved 
healthcare access, while risky health behaviour was the significant risk factor. In contrast 
to the early phase, we found higher disease risk in more crowded districts. In the late 
phase, risk-determinants concentrated around the capital and middle regions. Taking the 
type of risk-determinants and their spatial distributions across the three phases together, 
our results showed that pandemic had evolved from lower to higher density areas. This 
led to the second wave that emerged in Seoul and its surrounding areas. 
We observed noticeable spatial shifts in the risk determinants over the study period 
(Figure 4). Difficulty to social distancing increased COVID-19 risk in the capital and middle 
regions in the early phase which then shifted to the country’s southeast part in the middle 
phase. Area morbidity-associated risk was concentrated in the western part which then 
gradually shifted north in the middle phase. Education-associated risk was higher in the 
west in the early phase until it shifted southwest in the middle phase. Population mobility 
elevated COVID-19 risk only in the early phase for South Korea’s northern, eastern, and 
western parts. 
We investigated the correlations between all pairs of composite indices (Table S6). 
The largest Pearson’s r was 0.603 between healthcare access and area morbidity. We verified 
no multicollinearity given that the model’s standard error of both healthcare access (0.025) 
and crowding (0.09) were small. For a direct comparison between non-spatial and spatial 
models, GNBR and GWNBR were carried out with the same variables and stratified by 
the same periods (NBR: Figure 3, and GWNBR: Figure 4). AIC and dispersion coefficients 
were used to compare the models’ goodness of fit. 
4. Discussion 
This study provided a methodology to map COVID-19 risk associated with multiple 
SES and pandemic-specific epidemiological factors with high geographical granularity. 
We refined a social theories-enhanced CBF model to guide our variable choices. This 
model warrants the potential variables identified from the COVID-19 risk factor litera-
tures encompass the conceptual domains of (material, human, and capital) SES and plau-
sible to cause differential exposure, susceptibility, and disease severity. The simultaneous 
influence of multiple SES determinants defines disease risk. By creating multiple compo-
site SES indexes using PCA, this study clarified whether certain SES determinants inde-
pendently contributed to the COVID-19 risk over and above other SES factors. 
GWNBR created a continuous surface of relative COVID-19 risk for all 250 districts 
associated with area-health and socioeconomic determinants by the pandemic phases 
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(Figure 4). Our findings are consistent with individual and population-level studies that 
reported elevated COVID-19 risk associated with less healthcare access [29], and educa-
tion[30,31], and more risky health behaviour, crowding, specific comorbidities [1,20,23], difficulty 
to social distancing [2,21] and population mobility [32]. Our study’s high internal validity was 
shown since the GNBR and GWNBR results agreed except for crowding in the early phase. 
Our approach captured statistically and noticeably high spatial variation by pan-
demic phases for all themes, consistent with the reported pattern of COVID-19 distribu-
tion in the country [22,28]. Since its first confirmed case on January 20th, 2020, South Korea 
experienced two major outbreak waves in Daegu and Seoul, and the surrounding 
Gyeonggi-do province, respectively, in February (early phase) and May 2020 (late phase). 
After the first confirmed case, the KCDC invoked four-level alert for the public’s 
emergency awareness (blue-attention, yellow-caution, orange-alert, red-serious) com-
mensurate with the number of new confirmed cases [http://www.koreabiomed.com]. The 
epidemic’s initial wave in Daegu, caused by the local church activities, triggered the coun-
try-wide directives of hospital-based isolation/quarantine, contact tracing followed with 
free testing and treatment, strengthening medical centres for rapid diagnostics, emer-
gency medical responses, and treatment aids [22]. These specific measures along with high 
public adherence to the school and business closures, personal hygiene, and social dis-
tancing significantly dropped the case counts by mid-March. The second wave erupted in 
May when non-essential businesses reopened [28] in Seoul, which spread to its surround-
ing metropolises, Ulsan and Busan, and Gyeonggi-do. 
The types of risk determinants changed over the pandemic phases. Analysis stratified by 
periodic phases found that the initially high risk in the early period gradually decreased 
except healthcare access, health behaviour and crowding- associated risk, which increased 
in strength and concentrated in the capital and its surrounding provinces in the late 
phases (Figure 3 & Figure 4). Risk reductions could be explained by the impact of effective 
control measures that lowered the risk associated with these determinants and drop in an 
effective reproduction number (Re), as the number of infection-susceptible people de-
creased over time [33]. 
In the early phase, all health/SE themes were statistically significantly associated with 
COVID-19 incidence. As anticipated, there was no excess risk at Daegu and its surround-
ing areas since the abnormally high spike of COVID-19 cases was caused by local church’s 
activities [22,28] without relevance to the local area’s social status. 
The increase in health behaviour-associated risk is consistent with reports showing 
greater risk with poor emotional health [30], smoking [34], and obesity [1,35]. Individual 
patient-level COVID-19 risk-factors analysis Lusignan et al.,2020 [1] reported smoking 
was a protective factor. However, the authors warned that the low proportion of current 
smokers in their study sample (11.4%), resulted in a wide confidence interval of the re-
ported odds ratio, 0.59 (0.42–0.83). This increases the uncertainty of their result. Greater 
COVID-19 risk among the people with lower education has been explained as a reduced 
awareness of disease risk and low-income to obtain education. This relationship was 
clearly seen in our results as higher education associated with lower COVID-19 incidence. 
The difficulty to social distancing in this study directly reflected the inability to afford 
unemployment possibly resulting in the reduced exertion of protective measures [30,31]. 
The risks associated with social distancing and area-morbidity peaked in the study’s early 
phase appeared to reduce in the middle phase, and completely remediated in the study’s 
late phase. 
In the middle phase, all of the previous risk factors except for risky health behaviours, 
population mobility, and crowding were high. The middle phase’s lessened risk associ-
ated with risky health behaviours, population mobility and crowding may reflect the im-
pact of the Prime Minister’s declaration. This implemented active interventions for social 
distancing, community health education, testing with local contact, tracing, and hospital-
based or self-isolation during March’s first weeks. 
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Notably, the late phase findings are consistent with the risk factors reported associ-
ated with the second wave in early May. During our study’s late phase, South Korea 
scaled up free testing and treatment through its existing health care centres [28,36], which 
may have improved healthcare access a key measure for combating COVID-19. Our find-
ing that healthcare access exerts a stronger protective effect in the late phase compared 
with the earlier phases supports this. Our findings of increased risk associated with risky 
health behaviours may have captured behavioural fatigue at a population-scale in re-
sponse to the country’s multiple quarantine period extensions [37] that likely were exac-
erbated by entertainment business re-openings (i.e. night clubs, karaoke) in early May. 
Elevated risks associated with increased crowding in the study’s late phase reflects the 
outbreak’s second wave, which occurred in South Korea’s most crowded region: Seoul 
and its surroundings (Figure 3). 
Spatial variation in the SES-related risk factors across the pandemic phases potentially reflect 
the geography-specific control measures and/or the differential public response to the measures. 
GWNBR models revealed the pandemic phase-specific spatial variation for all health/SE 
themes except for population mobility which was not significant beyond the early phase. 
This may indicate that the effectiveness of the control measures varied over time poten-
tially due to differential interventions or public response across the municipal districts. 
Our findings may also indicate a dynamic change in population vulnerability throughout 
the pandemic “a person not considered vulnerable at the outset of a pandemic can become 
vulnerable depending on the policy response” as a Lancet editorial stated [38]. 
The factors increasing our recommended framework’s robustness include: 1) SES 
measurement and relationship conceptualization of the exposure (health/SE themes) and 
outcome (COVID-19 incidence) based on the refined conceptual framework; 2) joint use 
of conceptual and statistical modelling; 3) complementary use of global and local spatial 
statistics; and 4) stratified analysis by pandemic phases that enable us to capture the spa-
tial variation over pandemic phases. However, this methodological framework relies on 
carefully collected country-specific data. 
Our study is subject to ecological fallacy inherent to the study design. However, our 
empty hierarchical mixed model accounting for the individual and district-level data 
shows that 61% of the COVID-19 incidence distribution variation was explained by the 
district-level factors, leaving 39% of the variability for an explanation by individual fac-
tors. 
We verified that the data estimation for Daegu city subparts did not affect the study 
results. The comparison of the intercept, standard error, relative risk and P-value between 
the models with and without the estimated data showed that the intercept and standard 
error were diminished by 2.2% and by 9.2%, respectively in the models, including esti-
mated data [each calculated by 100 ×  (−12.29 -(−12.56))/−12.29 and 100 ×  (1.88–
2.95)/1.88, respectively]. A significance level change was observed for none of the model 
estimates, except for crowding. The P-value changed from ~0.06 to ~0.04 when the esti-
mated data were excluded. However, the crowding-associated risk remains significant at P 
= 0.1. Model details are provided in Table S4. To assess the periodic trend in the relative 
COVID-19 risk associated with SES factors, we conducted stratified analyses by the early, 
middle, and late phases corresponding with 20 January-20 March, 21 March-15 April, and 
16 April-1 July 2020. 
Population-based COVID-19 studies are prone to response bias, which would not 
exist if everybody was tested. However, multiple factors determine testing coverage, 
therefore, the number of confirmed cases, such as easy access for testing and its accuracy 
[39], contact tracing strategies [40], under-testing of asymptomatic patients [41]. Also, psy-
chological factors, a fear of COVID-19 [42], risk perception [43–45], and stigma related 
testing avoidance [46] impact testing rate. Potential bias in this study is expected to be low 
given South Korea’s anti-pandemic strategies. Importantly, the country’s COVID-19 relief 
programs supported with 15 billion Korea won, dedicated to support vulnerable popula-
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tions may have reduced the potential testing disparity by socioeconomic status. All Kore-
ans and foreigners were entitled to free testing and treatment, while testing access was 
more convenient through an extended number of rapid diagnostic centres and testing 
prompts through mobile phones. Contact tracing-based testing increases the likelihood of 
capturing asymptomatic cases. Korean tracing system has been reported as the global best 
practice lending to its advanced information technology system and data extensions 
through large consumer and healthcare databases (global positioning system, credit card 
transactions, closed-circuit television and medical facility use records) [47,48]. Testing 
avoidance from fear of stigma [46,49] would likely have affected the early period of the 
analysis, which strongly reflected the abnormally high spike of cases in Daegu city traced 
to the local church. The city has not disclosed the data with necessary granularity for a 
further investigation of this matter, as of writing. However, given these factors would 
likely result in under-estimation of confirmed cases, any bias in our results should be to-
ward the null. 
5. Conclusions 
The demonstrated methodology guides to design of multiple-determinant targeted 
interventions and pinpoint high-risk locales to remediate the excess COVID-19 risk at-
tributable to socioeconomic disadvantages. Overall, our work has demonstrated that the 
anti-pandemic measures taken by the South Korean government were effective. 
1. The completely remediated risk associated with area-morbidity and difficulty 
to social distancing is likely to be explained by the country’s emergency relief programs 
that targeted vulnerable individuals with socioeconomic disadvantages: Foreign workers, 
homeless, poor urban residents, disabled people, and elderly. The assistance programs 
provided free testing, financial support, food assistance, health check-up visits, as they 
acknowledged excess hardship in adhering to social distancing rules because of inability 
to afford unemployment. 
2. The observed overall protective effect of improved healthcare access and 
higher education in our study support the rationale behind the country’s primary anti-
pandemic agenda to strengthen healthcare facilities for rapid diagnostic and therapeutic 
services, combined with actionable health promotion rules which reportedly gained high 
public compliance. 
3. However, we found risky health behaviour was a persistent risk factor during 
both major outbreaks in Daegu and Seoul. Elevated crowding associated risk coincided 
with the Seoul outbreak, as anticipated. 
4. Persistently high-risks associated with health behaviour and crowding, com-
bined with the reduced protective effect of healthcare access and education in the study’s 
late phase may corroborate the finding that a prolonged pandemic induces adherence fa-
tigue and lessened risk perception [31,37]. 
South Korean public health interventions have been discussed in detail elsewhere 
[28] and we endorse the country’s anti-pandemic interventions as guidance to interna-
tional policymakers. The main highlights were: (1) Targeting vulnerable locales to 
COVID-19 and aiming to address multiple risk factors considering emergency relief pro-
grams to provide financial support, food assistance, health check-up visits; (2) implement-
ing social distancing while assisting individuals with difficulty to social distancing. Social 
distancing measures may include school/business closures, hospital-based or self-isolated 
quarantine; (3) improving healthcare access for expanded testing and treatment with pri-
ority health services made available to the individual with extenuating medical condi-
tions; (4) strengthening existing healthcare facilities and extending rapid diagnostic cen-
tres to enable easily accessible and free testing; (5) enhancing case identification capacity 
through information technology, such as contact tracing, mobile phone-based testing 
prompts and general risk alerts, rapid case-isolation by automated test result delivery to 
the testee’s mobile phones. 
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We emphasize the importance to anticipate adherence, behavioural, and mental fa-
tigue over the course of a prolonged epidemic. In the latter phase of the epidemic, we 
recommend paying intensified attention to the urban and highly crowded areas to prevent 
a potential outbreak as well as promoting creative social networking solutions (drive-
through services, virtual social events, telehealth, etc.) and ensuring emerging vaccine ac-
cessibility for the socially disadvantaged population [50]. 
We intend that this framework can be replicable to both, international researchers 
and policymakers, in order to enable rapid pandemic responses. As socioeconomic dis-
parity is a global problem, nationwide programs with an intensified focus on the vulner-
able populations at excess risk to pandemic ensure the efficacy and efficiency of pandemic 
alleviation efforts. 
Future research should assess the mortality, and mortality and incidence ratio as a 
crude surrogate for survival using the same study design and methodology. Understand-
ing the impact of socio-economic and epidemiological risk factors on mortality compared 
with incidence would clarify the extent of the potentially preventable deaths through 
modifications of the assessed risk factors. The overall and spatial disparity between mor-
tality, incidence, and mortality/incidence ratio would inform where intensified public 
health and intensified healthcare services are needed. 
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